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Abstract 
 
 This thesis aims to examine and critique the United States’ historical response to 
genocide. Beginning with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide in 1948, the author will highlight the lives of 
Raphael Lemkin and Senator William Proxmire in their personal crusades for U.S. 
ratification of the genocide ban. Culminating in a case study of the genocide in Sudan, 
the U.S. foreign policy towards genocide will be evaluated and charted through its 
evolution since 1948, through to ratification, and then at its applications in Cambodia, 
Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan. The self-proclaimed defender of human rights and 
peace loving, democratic institutions, the United States has historically fumbled the 
potential for positive, influential peacemaking roles on the international humanitarian 
stage. Examined against the backdrop of the geopolitics that defined, influenced, and 
ultimately dictated the foreign policy decisions, the author will examine the lessons that 
have been learned, missed, or ignored through the United States’ history of genocide 
prevention and intervention since 1948. 
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List of Abbreviations1 
 
Arakis:  Arakis Energy Corporation, an oil exploration company listed on the 
Vancouver (Canada) Stock Exchange (VSE). Arakis acquired part of the 
Chevron concession in Blocks 1, 2, and 4 in 1992. In 1997 it formed the 
Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), to develop and 
produce oil in those blocks; it was acquired in a merger by Talisman 
Energy Inc. in 1998.  
Baggara: Arabic word for cattlemen. The Baggara are nomads of western Sudan, 
including the Misseriya and Humr ethnic groups of southern Kordofan and 
the Rizeigat of southern Darfur. 
Beja Congress: A political party of eastern Sudanese Beja people, which took up arms in 
the 1990s and joined the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA). 
It claimed responsibility for January and May 2000 oil pipeline attacks. 
BP Amoco: One of the three largest integrated energy companies in the world. Since 
2000 it owns 20% of PetroChina’s Initial Public Offering. Now referred to 
as BP. 
Chevron Corp: A U.S. multinational integrated oil company granted oil concessions in 
Sudan in 1974. Pulling out of Sudan in 1984 for security reasons it sold its 
concessions in 1992. 
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation, a Chinese state-owned oil 
company that owns the largest 40% share of the GNPOC since 1997. 
Concorp: Concorp International, a private Sudanese oil company, which purchased 
Chevron Sudan concession in 1992. Has since sold it and owns a private 
oil refinery in the North. 
Danforth Points:  
Four points proposed by former US Senator John Danforth for the 
Sudanese government and the SPLM/A to meet. Agreeing on all points: a 
                                                             
1 "Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights." Human Rights Watch (2003): 1-581. The list of terms and abbreviations 
come, in large part, from the provided list of terms and abbreviations in the Human Rights Watch’s report 
on the connections between human rights abuses and the search for oil in Sudan. Though lengthy, the report 
deserves to be read in full by any monitor or student of Sudan as it skillfully and thoroughly examines and 
explains the resource driven genocide still occurring in the Sudan. 
vi 
 
humanitarian six-month cease-fire in the central Nuba Mountains region, 
with international monitors; willingness to cooperate with an 
internationally-sponsored commission to investigate the ongoing practice 
of slavery in Sudan; establishment of “zones of tranquility” to allow for 
emergency humanitarian interventions; and not to target civilians or 
civilian objects in the war in the south, with international monitoring. 
DUP:  Democratic Unionist Party, a political party in exile and part of the NDA; 
its leader, Moulana Mohammed Osman El Mirghani, also heads the NDA. 
Dinka: A tribal people group living in the Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile 
provinces of Sudan; very likely the largest ethnic group in Sudan 
comprising approx. 12% of the population. Many have converted to 
Christianity and speak Dinka. 
GNPOC: Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, the joint venture among 
Talisman, CNPC, Petronas, and Sudapet to own and develop Blocks 1, 2, 
and 4 of Sudan’s Muglad Basin oil fields. It also owns the pipeline 
connecting the GNPOC oil fields to the Red Sea and the port build on the 
Red Sea for oil supertankers. 
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development, comprising of Ethiopia, 
Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. Has hosted peace 
negotiations between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A since 
1993. 
Jallaba: Arabic term for merchant, trader, or importer. In southern Sudan it also 
has the historical meaning of slave trader, and is applied to all northern 
Sudanese. 
Khartoum Peace Agreement: 
 Signed in Khartoum on April 21, 1997, by the government of Sudan and 
six leaders of the rebel factions that had been secretly allied with 
Khartoum for years. 
LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army, Ugandan rebel group noted for its gross abuses 
of human rights; the LRA has been supported by the Sudanese 
government and operates in northern Uganda out of bases near 
government garrison towns of Juba in southern Sudan. 
Lundin Oil: A Swedish oil company and owner of IPC which had a 40.375% share in 
Block 5A and retains a 24.5% interest in Block 5B. 
Misseriya: A Baggara ethnic group of Arabic-speaking cattle-owning nomads living 
in southern Kordofan. 
Mujahedeen: Arabic word for the Muslim concept of holy warriors in jihad (holy war); 
used to refer to Islamist militias sponsored by the government of Sudan. 
vii 
 
Muraheleen: The Misseriya word for “travelers,” now referring to Baggara tribal 
militias of southern Darfur and southern Kordofan armed by successive 
Sudanese governments, and incorporated into government militias under 
army jurisdiction in 1989. 
National Congress:  
The Islamist political party formed from the National Islamic Front under 
the 1999 Sudan constitution. 
NDA: National Democratic Alliance, opposition alliance of political parties and 
armed groups formed in exile; members include the SPLM/A, DUP, 
Sudan Alliance Forces, Beja Congress, and others. 
NIF: National Islamic Front, the militant Islamist political party that came to 
power in 1989 after a military coup overthrew the elected government. 
Initially known as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Nuba: An African people group living in Southern Kordofan’s Nuba Mountains, 
comprised of fifty ethnic groups and subgroups with over ten distinct 
language groups using Arabic as their lingua franca. While some are 
Muslims and Christians, others practice traditional Nuba religions. Their 
territory was divided between government and rebel areas until a January 
2002 ceasefire. 
Nuer: A tribal people group living in the the Upper Nile region of Sudan; the 
second largest people group in southern Sudan. Although many have 
converted to Christianity and still speak Nuer, others practice a traditional 
Nuer religion. 
PDF: Popular Defence Force, an Islamist government-sponsored militia under 
the jurisdiction of the Sudanese Army. 
PetroChina: Chinese oil company formed of CNPC domestic Chinese assets and 
liabilities in 1999, to raise money for domestic Chinese oil and gas 
operations; CNPC owns 90% of Petrochina. 
Petronas: Petronas Carigali Overseas Sudan Berhad, the wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Petronas Nasional Berhad, the national corporation of Malaysia, which 
owns a 30% share of the GNPOC, a 28.5% share of Block 5A, and a 41% 
share of Block 5B. 
SPDF: Sudan People’s Democratic Front/Defence Forces, a southern 
antigovernment military and political force by Riek Machar in early 2000; 
merged with SPLM/A in January 2002. 
SPLM/A: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, the political organization and 
army of Sudanese rebels formed in 1983. It remains the largest rebel group 
in Sudan. 
viii 
 
SSCC: Southern States Coordinating Council, created by the 1997 Khartoum 
Peace Agreement to govern southern Sudan prior to a self-determination 
referendum to be held, pursuant to that agreement. 
SSDF: South Sudan Defense Force, a government umbrella group for former 
rebel factions headed by Riek Machar until 2000, formed as a result of the 
1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. 
SSLM/A: South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, a political pro-southern 
independence movement. In July 2002 it signed the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement with the government. 
State Petroleum:  
Company that bought the rights to Blocks 1, 2, and 4 from Concorp, which 
had bought them from Chevron in 1992. Went into partnership with 
Arakis Energy to develop the oil fields and was bought out by Arakis. 
Sudapet: Sudapet Ltd., the state-owned oil company of Sudan, which owns a 5% 
share of the GNPOC consortium and a 5% share of the Block 5A 
consortium; owns 10% of  Block 5B with Petronas. 
Talisman: Talisman Energy Inc, the largest independent Canadian oil and gas 
producer. It owned 25% of GNPOC from October 1998 to early 2003. It is 
now one of Canada’s largest corporations. 
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Introduction 
 
  War crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide have defined human conflict 
since antiquity. That they have occurred in recent history is not unique to history. What is 
unique, however, is the human comprehension and classification of these atrocities in the 
20th century. In fact, even in some of the earliest available written records evidence of 
genocide and crimes against humanity can be found. For example, Deuteronomy, a book 
in the Bible consisting of three sermons delivered by Moses, explains the Israelites’ 
unbridled and divinely condoned conquest towards their Promise Land. “And we took all 
his [Sihon, King of Heshbon] cities at that time, and utterly destroyed the men, and the 
women, and the little ones, of every city, we left none to remain.”2 While a discussion of 
the theological implications and consequences of the numerous passages found 
throughout Deuteronomy, Joshua, and 1 Samuel is not appropriate for the purposes of 
this paper it is necessary to acknowledge that while the advances in technology, 
communication, transportation, and human categorization certainly enabled the death 
tolls unseen until the recent century, genocide is not a new sin to plague mankind. 
 In the 20th century genocide ranked as the leading cause of preventable deaths, 
outranking even war.3 Even in the face of staggering statistics of untold death and the 
apparent recognition of the responsibility to prevent such atrocities at the United Nation’s 
                                                             
2 Deuteronomy 2:34 (New Revised Standard Version) 
3 Blum, Rony, et al. "'Ethnic Cleansing' Bleaches the Atrocities of Genocide." European Journal of Public 
Health 18.2 (2007): 204. Web. February 21, 2011. Pg.1. 
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(UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948, 
the world still remains either unwilling or unequipped to adequately and effectively 
intervene to prevent genocide. This paper, in large part, begins with the “father of 
genocide,” Raphael Lemkin, highlighting his tireless efforts in response to the Armenian 
genocide and the Holocaust. Lemkin’s assiduous pursuit to not only coin the term 
“genocide” but force the international community to recognize its responsibility to 
prevent and protect against it proved indispensable to codifying it into international law 
but failed to provide the mechanisms to enforce that law. 
  Why then has the international community failed to prevent genocide even while 
it routinely cries “Never Again!” after scenes of the Holocaust and the most recent 
genocide pass through our conscience? More especially, why has not the United States, 
the world’s self-proclaimed champion of human rights, morality, and peace-loving 
democracy, taken a more progressive and effectual stand in the fight against the crime 
that attacks of the very core of human rights and values of morality and democracy? Why 
did it take four decades before the United States would even sign and ratify the UN’s 
Genocide Convention? And why has the United States either been too late, not present, or 
painfully incompetent in its attempts to predict and intervene to prevent genocide since? 
The aim of this paper, then, is to unpack the evolution of the politics of genocide since 
1948, to better understand why the world’s greatest powers remain hamstrung by geo-
politics that have defined every response to genocide since. If the benefit of the doubt, for 
the time being, is to be given to the political will to prevent genocide why is the world 
still witnessing the unimaginable suffering, death, and atrocity of genocide? 
3 
 
 While a comprehensive answer to all these concerns would certainly entail an 
examination of every international actor at play, and especially those of the five members 
of the UN Security Council, for the purposes of the paper the scope will be largely 
focused to the American response to genocide. Concomitantly, the paper focuses on the 
Cambodian, Iraqi, Bosnian, and Rwandan genocides. It is true there have been several 
others both before and after these examples; these have been selected in both the interest 
to time and space and the degree to which the United States played an influencing and 
potentially constructive role in their happening. Each will be further examined to identify 
the factors of accountability, leadership, grassroots activism, political costs, and national 
interests that defined the silence or call-to-action of each genocide. 
 Furthermore, the scope of the American response to genocide will be limited to 
efforts of prevention and intervention. To date, while significant and necessary dialogue 
and action has already been made towards the prosecution of human rights violators in 
Sudan, most notably the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) indictment of Sudan 
President Omar Hassan al-Bashir for crimes against humanity and three counts of 
genocide,4 emphasis will be kept on the balance between prevention and intervention for 
practical reasons of space and time, but also, and more importantly, for the simple fact 
that by the time the discussion of prosecution is necessary it is already too late for 
thousands and sometimes millions of innocent men, women, and children. Prosecuting 
war criminal and human rights violators plays an important and effective role in future 
prevention efforts but until the international community can effectively prevent and 
intervene, the discussion of prosecuting genocide will always be retroactive.  
                                                             
4 Simons, Marlise. "International Court Adds Genocide to Charges Against Sudan Leader." The New York 
Times, July 12, 2010, p. A4 
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 Finally, the genocide in Sudan beginning in 2003 will be drawn upon as a case 
study to evaluate the lessons learned or have proved yet to be learned. In any study of 
genocide modesty must be remembered to varying degrees. It is true that while several 
genocides have been compared, often to their detriment, no two genocides are the same. 
The world has consciously sought to study the historical lessons of genocide to better 
predict future cases but it will never be a science. There will never be another Armenian 
genocide, Holocaust, or Rwanda. The world can learn from them to better understand the 
contributing and enabling factors of genocide but it will never find an “equation of 
genocide” because an exhaustive one does not exist. That said, though the American 
response to the genocide in Sudan improved and evolved considerably it still failed, and 
in many ways, continues to do so. What must change then? What are the lessons to be 
learned from Sudan? What could have or should have the United States done differently 
that would have possibly produced tangible on-the-ground effects for the targeted 
Sudanese? Recommending improved approaches, reactions, and expectations through 
factors of accountability, leadership, grassroots activism, political cost, and national 
interest; this paper aims to answer these questions. 
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Chapter 1 
Genocide, Before It Was Genocide 
 
 Coined the “Beastly Century” by British novelist Margaret Drabble,5 the twentieth 
century easily lays claim to bloodiest years of all human history. The Nazi rise to power 
and war machine in the 1930s and 1940s proved even the most enlightened, democratic, 
and liberal constitution to date could be manipulated and cast aside to butcher and 
massacre several millions in the shadow of an observant audience’s silence. The 1990s 
proved, yet again, that Europeans were still capable of targeting and massacring based 
purely on racial biases and prejudices. While Drabble in many ways accurately described 
the actions and abuses of the twentieth century as “beastly,” the twentieth century was in 
many ways characteristically, typically, and habitually “human.” While the enormous 
estimate of 231 million6 people who have died by “human decision”7 in the twentieth 
century may be the unique product of the advent of the all-encompassing destruction of 
total war technology, its root human origin is predictably and undeniably historic. 
 As old as war and war crimes are throughout human history so also are the 
acknowledgements and regulation of human conduct in warfare. From Cain’s imposed 
                                                             
5 Drabble, Margaret. "A Beastly Century." American Scholar 70, no. 1 (2001).  Pg.160. 
6 Leitenberg, Milton. "Death in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century." Cornell University: Peace Studies 
Program (2006): 1-86.  Pg.1. 
7 Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. London: Michael Joseph, 
1994. In his work Hobsbrawn coins the phrase “human decision” and judging by the fact he claims he is a 
life-long member of the Communist party in his autobiography Interesting Times: A Twentieth-Century Life 
(New York: Pantheon, 2003) his definition and constitution of “human decision” must be examined in this 
light. 
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guilt in response to the murder of his brother Abel8 to Israelite King Menahem’s sacking 
of Tiphsah and “massacr[ing] its people and ripp[ing] open all of its pregnant women”9 
the Bible is riddled with warfare, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Herodotus, 
who many claim to be one of the world’s first examples of a “historian,” writes in The 
Histories that even King Xerxes, the most feared of all Persian Kings, acknowledges 
there must be constraint and sanctions in warfare when he baulked saying, “he would not 
be like the Lacedaemonians, for they have broken what is customary usage among all 
mankind by killing the heralds; but I will not myself do what I rebuke them for, nor by 
counterkilling will I release the Lacedaemonians guilt.”10 This same value of restraint can 
be seen later in the writings of Christian theologians St. Augustine and St.  
Thomas Aquinas. Both wrote advocating the rules of chivalry and restraint that 
prohibited attacks on women and children in warfare. These very same morals and values 
were finally codified by arguably the father of international law, Hugo Grotius, in 1625.11 
Unfortunately, chivalry had its limits and extended only to other Christians. As Antonio 
Santosuosso so dispassionately explains, chivalry was “little more than an insurance 
policy for the fighting upper classes.”12 Beginning with the First Crusade (1095-1099) 
these Christian holy warriors ushered in an era of unseen horrors and bloodshed not seen 
for millennia. “Torture and mutilation became a feature of the early decades of Crusader 
                                                             
8 Stern, David H. Complete Jewish Bible. Clarksville, MD: Jewish New Testament Publications, Inc., 2006. 
Genesis 4: 1-8. 
9 Teluskin, Rabbi Joseph. Biblical Literacy: The Most Important People, Events, and Ideas of the Hebrew 
Bible. New York: Harper Collins, 1997. Pg.165. 
10 Marincola, John M., and Aubrey De Selincourt. Herodotus: The Histories. New York City: Penguin 
Classics, 1996. 7:136. 
11 Neier, Aryeh. War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice. New York: Times 
Books, 1998. Pg. 13. 
12 Santosuosso, Antonio. Barbarians, Marauders, and Infidels. Boulder: Westview Press, 2004. Pg.224. 
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warfare in the Middle East.”13 In fact, many of the crusaders found solace in their torture 
of men and selling of women and children into slavery through the Roman Catholic 
Church’s justification of war and the varying codes of conduct. The church’s attempt to 
quell indiscriminate war through its Pax Ecclescie (Peace of God) and Truega Dei (Truce 
of God) fell far short of humanitarian efforts. These church doctrines, differentiating war 
between general enemies or against Muslim and pagans, only further vindicated the war 
crimes and atrocities committed in the name of G-d and driven by deep hatreds and 
stereotypes.  
 While little at this time did much to still the indiscriminate and inhumane violence 
justified by the Roman Catholic Church and defended by chivalry, there would be new 
developments and ideas that would prove instrumental to new ideas of human rights. 
Beginning in 1215, the Magna Carta and later Emperor Charles V’s “Carolina of 1532” 
would label and identify acts justifiably deemed as “crimes.” Concomitantly, a German 
monk by the name of Martin Luther began debating the relationship between state and 
citizen during the intense political, religious, and social turmoil of the time. Developing a 
theology that would eventually produce the Reformation and spawn the subsequent break 
from the Roman Catholic Church, Martin Luther struggled with the enigmatic concept 
Richard Marius has called “’the priesthood of all believers’ vis-à-vis that of the Roman 
Catholic Church.”14 Martin Luther’s break from the Roman Catholic Church hints at the 
power of the concept of individual rights in the spiritual sense that subsequently, in a 
much broader sense, paved the way for the movement of new and emerging ideas 
                                                             
13 Nicolle, David. Crusader Warfare. I, Byzantium, Europe, and the Struggle for the Holy Land, 1050-
1300. London: Continuum, 2007. Pg.42. 
14 Crowe, David M. “War Crimes and Genocide in History, and the Evolution of Responsive International 
Law.” Nationalities Papers 37, no.6 (November 2006): 757-806. Pg.760. 
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historians would later call “the Enlightenment.”  
 To fully comprehend the changes taking place at this time in the international 
response to warfare and its crimes it is necessary to understand the dramatic changes and 
developments that had been taking form in warfare in recent centuries. With greater 
control and manipulation of gunpowder the tactics of war became more devastating and, 
thus, more damaging upon society. Those witnessing the rise of this technology believed 
it be an invention or gift from of the devil and were uncomfortable with the equalizing 
effect gunpowder created. The need for chivalry and codified war conduct became all the 
more needed and desired when the peasant could, with one shot, strike down a knight. 
Pre-Enlightenment technologies like gunpowder and the tools to devastatingly harness its 
power shifted the battlefield strategies of the next era to ones that advantaged large 
standing armies. This “new model army” was more destructive and powerful producing a 
grander scale of carnage and destruction.  
 Often heralded as the driving force of the Enlightenment, in fact, were the new 
values and ideas associated with individual rights within the state. One of the most 
influential Enlightenment thinkers, John Locke, wrote in his Two Treatises of Civil 
Government (1690) that essentially the government existed upon the collective will of the 
populace and therefore never truly has dominion or power over the people. True values of 
respect and toleration began to take shape during this time as, once again, Locke penned 
in his Letter Concerning Toleration, “neither pagan, nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to 
be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth, because of his religion.”15 Just as 
Martin Luther helped set the stage for a conception of individual rights, at least in the 
                                                             
15 Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Abridged and edited with an Introduction and 
Notes, by Kenneth P. Winkler. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996. Pg.172. 
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spiritual sense, in the Reformation, John Locke greatly contributed to the value of 
individual rights in the political sense during the Enlightenment. 
 For many of the same reasons 14th and 15th century leaders began considering new 
codified war conduct in light of the new devastating war tactics, the scene was set for the 
emergence of new thought on international and humanitarian law in the tumultuous 19th 
century. The Industrial Revolution ushered in a new era of political upheaval, militant 
ethnic nationalism, and an industrial arms race that redefined the face of war.16 How this 
new wave of technology differed from preceding eras is significant. Although the 
industrial weapons of war continued to grow exponentially destructive and horrendous, 
often altering landscapes entirely, many of the technologies that prompted the desire and 
shift towards more comprehensive international humanitarian law were fundamentally 
non-militaristic. 
 Arguably one of the most dramatic changes to the face, image, and memory of war 
came with the emergence of the war correspondent, or journalist. With improved 
telegraph technologies, speed, and capabilities the war correspondent was now able to 
report from the field. Until this time much of what was remembered or recounted of war 
came from glorified accounts of commanders and generals. The emphasis had been on 
deeds of bravery and heroism rather than the gruesome and hellacious nature of war the 
journalists were depicting. With more accurate and current reporting of the nature of war 
the true state of affairs of the wounded became unforgettably apparent. Spurred by the 
new realities and horrors of war and its effect on its combatants Florence Nightingale 
sailed to the Crimea, not coincidentally the first war theater with wartime journalists, and 
                                                             
16 Crowe, Pg.762. 
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established what would become the focus of the first Red Cross Convention17  
 The American Civil War, however, would see the greatest number of war 
correspondents, for according to British journalist Phillip Knightley, “some 500 went off 
to report the war for the North alone.”18 The exposure the wave of journalists created was 
unparalleled. For the first time in history the general public was given daily exposure to 
the brutalities of war in each morning’s newspaper and publication. The new face of war 
aroused strong reactions from the public that demanded response.  Consequently, in 
1863, President Abraham Lincoln ordered the War Department to draft and propagate a 
codified manual of war conduct to govern the Union Army. This war code, which 
ultimately consisted of 159 articles, would later be credited as being a predecessor to the 
subsequent binding agreements of militaries worldwide.19 The following year the first 
international agreement, a “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded Armies in the Field” would be signed with the “Convention with Respect to the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land” being adopted thirty-five years later in 1899. Both 
agreements were supported by the international bodies at The Hague and Geneva and 
would provide the legal framework and human rights consciousness necessary to form 
the first true international law concerning genocide. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 Neier, Pg.14. 
18 Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, 1975. 
19 Neier, Pg.14. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Man, The Crime, The Name  
 
 As indicated above, the history of the international community’s adoption of 
genocide prevention into international law in 1948 begins centuries, if not millennia, 
before; however, the narrative of Raphael Lemkin and1948 genocide convention finds 
immediate roots in the Armenian Genocide just decades earlier. 
 Intrigued by a news article on Armenian Soghomon Tehlirian’s assassination of 
Mehmet Talaat, the principal architect of the Armenian Genocide, in 1921, Lemkin, then 
just a twenty-one years old linguistic student in Poland inquired to a professor as to why 
Talaat had not been brought to justice for this crimes against the Armenian people. 
Lemkin recollected his professor responded explaining had yet existed a law under which 
Talaat could be extradited, tried, and sentenced. Lemkin, confused and disturbed, 
protested, “It is a crime for Tehlirian to kill a man, but it is not a crime for his oppressor 
to kill more than a million men? This is most inconsistent.”20 Even in one of Lemkin’s 
first experiences of the incompetence of international humanitarian law he touched upon 
the linchpin that would plague and encumber the 1948 genocide convention for half a 
century, concerns for state sovereignty. 
 State sovereignty, or the ability of a state to govern, regulate, and engage its 
                                                             
20 Bartlett, Robert M. They Stand Invincible: Men Who Are Reshaping Our World. New York City: Thomas 
Y. Corwell, 1959. Pg.96-7. 
12 
 
citizens as it sees fit, would prove to be the favorite rationale for international bodies to 
circumvent the moral prerogative for an international intervention long after Lemkin’s 
college days. Lemkin expressed his disgust, “Sovereignty implies conducting an 
independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads . . . all 
types of activity directed towards the welfare of people. Sovereignty cannot be conceived 
as the right to kill millions of innocent people.”21 The subsequent British effort to 
persecute Turkish perpetrators failed due to a lack of political cost for international actors 
and insufficient national or strategic interest to intervene. Samantha Power correctly 
notes in her A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, “Passion, 
[Lemkin] knew, would often make a travesty of justice. Impunity for mass murderers like 
Talaat had to end; retribution had to be legalized.”22 
 Lemkin, a Polish Jew, lawyer, and linguist who commanded an excessive of 
seven languages, began a lifelong crusade to advocate on behalf of national, ethnic, 
political, and religious minorities being persecuted under the banner of state sovereignty 
that shielded both perpetrator and bystander from persecution or a responsibility to 
intervene. Lemkin would eventually live to see his efforts single-handedly reshape the 
world’s international humanitarian law but for every victory, Lemkin would find out, he 
was met with a long string of abuses, rejections, and frustrations. Lemkin’s first step was 
to transform the way his nation targeted others committing injustice and crimes against 
humanity. A local prosecutor in Poland at the time Lemkin drafted a law that aimed to 
ban barbarity as “the premeditated destruction of national, racial, religious and social 
collectivities” and vandalism which he defined as “the destruction of works of art and 
                                                             
21 Lemkin, Raphael. Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin. Ch.1. Lemkin’s 
autobiography remains incomplete. Many of Lemkin’s personal papers, including his haphazardly 
numbered autobiography, can be found by contacting Rabbi Steven L. Jacobs of the University of 
Alabama. 
22 Power, Samantha. A Problem From Hell: American and the Age of Genocide. New York: First Harper 
Perennial, 2007. Pg.19. 
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culture, being the expression of the particular genius of these collectivities.”23 Lemkin 
submitted this draft to the Madrid conference in 1933 but was not allowed by Polish 
authorities to present his proposal in person. Lemkin experienced his first defeat. The 
proposal was tabled. “They would not say ‘yes,’ and they could not say ‘no,’” Lemkin 
wrote. Just Lemkin’s initial proposal called for intervention the fears and cries for state 
sovereignty shrouded in contemporary geo-politics so too would similar subsequent 
proposals be shrouded. What Lemkin was quickly learning was that cries for early action 
and prevention to uninvolved international actors would fall on deaf ears without hooking 
national interest into the narrative. 
 Forecasting the coming persecution, Lemkin fled Europe a week before the Nazi 
invasion of Poland. Eventually arriving on the shores of the United States Lemkin 
continued his crusade with a whole reason and fervor for an international humanitarian 
law committing nations to intervene in genocidal states. In fact, the very same evening of 
his arrival Lemkin passionately begged to ask his American audience, “If women, 
children, and old people would be murdered a hundred miles from here, wouldn’t you 
help? Then why do you stop this decision of your heart when the distance is 3,000 miles 
instead of a hundred?”24 Lemkin found only restrained and limited concern. He realized 
he must put national interest, political cost, and grassroots activism at the head of his 
crusade. Lemkin would later reflect, “I realized I was following the wrong path.”25 He 
changed gears and direction.  “Let me now tell this story to the American people, to the 
man in the street, in church, on the porches of their houses and in their kitchens and 
drawing rooms . . . The recognition of truth will cease to be a personal favor to me, but a 
                                                             
23 Lemkin, Raphael. The Evolution of the Genocide Convention. Lemkin Papers: New York Public Library. 
Pg.1. 
24 Lemkin, “Totally Unofficial,” ch.6, pg.96. 
25 Ibid. Ch.7, pg.5. 
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logical necessity.” 26 Lemkin realized Washington would remain silent until inaction 
carried a political cost; the citizens must be emboldened. The change Lemkin sought had 
to first come from the bottom, but needed a hook; what it needed was a name.  
 After two years of delivering hundred of speeches across the United States 
Lemkin took a step back and reviewed a speech given by Winston Churchill in 1941, 
famously exclaiming, “We are in the presence of a crime without a name.”27 As fate 
would have it Lemkin’s passion for humanitarian law and linguistics found an effective 
and history-altering intersection.  
 Appearing first in Lemkin’s 1944 treatise Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,28 
Lemkin coined the term “genocide” intending it more than a mere word but, instead, a 
conception. “Genocide,” derived from the Greek geno, meaning “race” or “tribe,” and the 
Latin cide, meaning “killing,” was intended to help the world conceive the 
unconceivable. Before preventative action was possible the international community must 
first understand. From conception, Lemkin envisioned, could laws, treaties, and 
mechanisms for legal and preventative action take root and originate. Defined in Axis 
Rule “genocide” meant “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction 
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves.”29 According to Lemkin, genocide has two phases: “one, destruction 
of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national 
                                                             
26 Ibid. Pg.7. 
27 Gilbert, Martin, ed. The Churchill War Papers: The Ever-Widening War. Vol. 3. New York City: W.W. 
Norton, 2000.  Pg. 1099-1106. Interestingly enough, this statement was not in reference to the destruction 
of European Jewry, though it was this interpretation that inspired Lemkin, but instead referring to the Nazi 
atrocities towards the Russians. 
28 Some genocide scholars argue the origin of the term “genocide” is more appropriately dated at November 
15, 1943, as the preface, where the term first appears, is, in fact, date as such, and not the 1944 publishing 
date. 
29 Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of 
International Law, 1944. Pg.79. 
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pattern of the oppressor.”30 Lemkin was deliberate in that complete physical destruction 
was not included in his definition. For Lemkin, a people group’s culture and identity 
needed protection by equal measure. “It takes centuries and sometimes thousands of 
years to create a natural culture, but Genocide can destroy a culture instantly, like a fire 
can destroy a building in an hour.”31 Lemkin’s foresight is crucial to note. He knew what 
needed to be avoided was the correlation and equation between the Holocaust and 
genocide. Lemkin feared that if the Holocaust’s near complete physical destruction 
proved the litmus and standard by which future genocide were to be judged any law or 
charter would prove impossible to implement or too late in its application. Though, as 
Power aptly writes,  
But the link between Hitler’s Final Solution and Lemkin’s hybrid term would 
cause endless confusion for policymakers and ordinary people who assumed that 
genocide occurred only where the perpetrator of atrocity could be shown, like 
Hitler, to possess an intent to exterminate every last member of an ethnic, 
national, or religious group.32 
Lemkin succeeded in galvanizing the international community’s guttural reaction to the 
word, but, as would be increasingly apparent, words are merely a paper tiger unless the 
necessary powers are pushed to action by the political cost of inaction, national interest, 
grassroots activism, leadership, and accountability. Lemkin had succeeded in gaining 
fame for his word; what he needed now was the mechanism to commit the international 
community to acting on the word to prevent “the crime of crimes.”33 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 Lemkin, Axis Rule, Pg.79. 
31 Lemkin, Raphael. The Importance of the Convention. New York City: New York Public Library. Pg.1.  
32 Power, A Problem From Hell. Pg.43. 
33 Lemkin, Raphael. "Genocide as a Crime Under International Law (1947)." American Journal of 
International Law 41, no. 1: 145-51. 
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Chapter 3 
The Convention 
 
 Armed with several years of advocacy experience, a new word, and more 
effective strategy, Lemkin set his sights on the UN General Assembly in New York, New 
York in 1946. Realizing the major powers would never act on cries of justice alone 
Lemkin focused on pulling on the nations’ heartstring, national interest. The cost of 
genocide to the victim was obvious and as tragic as it was, it was never enough. 
Therefore, Lemkin begin emphasizing the cost of genocide to the bystander. Lemkin 
explained, “Large countries can defend themselves by arms; small countries need the 
protection of the law.”34 This proved successful. Panama, Cuba, and India endorsed his 
drafted resolution. Lemkin got his break and on December 11, 1946, after significant 
battle over keeping “genocide” in lieu of “extermination,” the UN General Assembly 
unanimously passed Lemkin’s resolution condemning genocide. Lemkin had achieved 
what many believed to be impossible. Unfortunately, Lemkin’s crusade had yet to 
experience the toughest battle yet, the battle on the geopolitical stage of international law. 
The bridge between resolution and law was still to be crossed, and it would prove to be a 
long one. 
                                                             
34 Lemkin, “Totally Unofficial.” Ch.9, pg.8. 
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 Lemkin’s next move was brilliant. As he had learned already, he must play to the 
domestic political interests of the UN nation states. This time, however, he added 
political cost to the fold. Power explains, “[Lemkin] assembled a committee that spoke 
for groups in twenty-eight countries and claimed a remarkable joint membership of more 
than 240 million people. The committee . . . compiled and sent petitions to each UN 
delegate urging passage of the convention.” Lemkin’s political acumen was beyond 
effective. Generally drafting the letters himself Lemkin “used the letters to make 
delegates feel as if ‘by working for the Genocide Convention,’ they were ‘representing 
the wishes of their own people.’”35 By using his multi-national committee as his 
mouthpiece Lemkin magnified his voice, all the while, creating a political cost for 
inaction. After significant frustration and battle, Lemkin’s strategy worked. 
 On December 9, 1948, after fifty-five delegates voted “yes” (none voted “no”), 
the UN General Assembly unanimously passed the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. It defined genocide as, 
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
  A: Killing members of a group; 
  B: Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
C: Deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
  D: Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
  E: Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.36 
                                                             
35 Power, pg.55. 
36 UN General Assembly, Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 9 December 
1948, A/RES/260. Article II. 
18 
 
One of the major weaknesses to this definition, however, is the required intent of the 
perpetrator. In other words, unless the perpetrator targets national, ethnical, racial, or 
religious groups as such then the law does not apply and the perpetrator cannot be 
charged with genocide. For Lemkin, though, the motives were irrelevant as the result was 
the same. Weaknesses aside, the genocide convention was a monumental success 
especially when the reader takes into consideration it was largely the result of one man’s 
crusade. Almost numb, Lemkin recalled, “A storm of applause followed. I felt on my face 
the flashlight of cameras . . . The world was smiling and approving and I had only one 
word in answer to all that, ‘Thanks.’”37 As great and influential as Lemkin’s success was, 
it would prove limited. Though Lemkin had single-handedly altered international 
humanitarian law and would be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize five separate times 
in 1950, 1951, 1952, 1958, and 1959,38 his accomplishments would be proverbially 
handcuffed and shrouded by the politics of genocide. Lemkin would die on August 28, 
1959 of a heart attack at fifty-nine years old, penniless,39 with only seven people in 
attendance at his funeral40, and would never live to see U.S. ratification of the 1948 
Genocide Convention. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
37 Lemkin, “Totally Unofficial.” Ch.12, pg.59. 
38 Jacobs, Stevens, “The Papers of Raphael Lemkin: A First Look,” Journal of Genocide Research 1, no.1, 
(1999): 108 
39 Power, pg.78. 
40 Rosenthal, A.M., “A Man Called Lemkin,” New York Times, October 18, 1988, p. A31. 
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Chapter 4 
Politics, Proxmire, & Procrastination 
 
 Mired in the geopolitical quagmire of what would later be known as the Cold 
War, Lemkin’s 1948 Genocide Convention would remain a dead letter for decades after 
his death. Officially going into effect on January 12, 1951, the charter’s weakness of 
language and focus reflects the politics of the day. Emphasis lay in the protocol of 
prosecution of genocide rather than prevention and the exclusion of political groups from 
the definition of genocide reflected the wishes and fears of the major constituencies. 
 State sovereignty is a double-edge sword. Its proves just as useful a shield for 
perpetrator and bystander alike, and all the major powers had reason to fear the vague 
wording of Lemkin’s law. The Soviet Union, sensitive the charter was a Trojan horse to 
indict the nation for its own crimes during World War 2, did ratify the 1948 Genocide 
Convention after Lemkin personally assured the Soviet blocs the charter was not an anti-
communist conspiracy.41 Most surprising in the narrative of the Lemkin’s law, however, 
is the storyline and role of the United States. 
 The self-proclaimed champion of human rights, the United States was, in the 
beginning, Lemkin and international humanitarian law’s most vocal and influential 
advocate. A major player in the drafting of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                             
41 Interesting to note, however, is the fact that just five years later Lemkin argued the Soviet Union was one 
of the few countries that could be charged with genocide. These threats never materialized. 
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Rights and the first nation to sign the pact in 1948, few questioned American resolve and 
dedication to the genocide ban. President Harry Truman, in fact, called for ratification 
saying the U.S. had “long been a symbol of freedom and democratic progress to peoples 
less-favored.”42 Couple with deputy undersecretary of state Dean Rusk’s comment that 
U.S. ratification was vital in the effort to “demonstrate to the rest of the world that the 
United States is determined to maintain its moral leadership in international affairs”43 
ratification seemed eminent. Lemkin’s law was not without its opponents, many of whom 
feared the removal of the shield of state sovereignty may lay bare too many skeletons in 
the closet and expose the U.S. to criticism and targeting by the genocide convention 
itself. 
 As frustrating as they may be, the United States had legitimate reasons to fear the 
genocide ban. Historically, the U.S. has always retained strong values of state sovereignty 
and isolationism. Though initially the most vocal proponent for the genocide ban Power 
rightfully illustrates the United States’ limited history of international cooperation by 
Rusk’s “anticlimactic” and “absurd” correlation. “The United States has coopered in the 
past with other nations in the suppression of lesser offenses as the killing fur seals.” Rusk 
continued, “It is natural that other nations look to the United States for cooperation in the 
suppression of the most heinous offense of all, the destruction of human groups.”44 
Unfortunately for Rusk, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations found it difficult to 
make the jump from protecting fur seals to entangling the nation in foreign affairs, 
risking foreign alliances, or, simply put, eventually exposing the nation to the threat of 
                                                             
42 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Genocide Convention: Hearings Before the Senate 
Committee on the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide, 
81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, pg.15. 
43 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, pg.204-5. 
44 Ibid, pg.15. See also: Power, pg.65. 
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the genocide ban itself. American critics of the genocide ban opposed ratification 
presenting the case of legitimate definitional discrepancies. 
The lack of a qualifying threshold for genocide presented a problem for many US 
Senators. The question of just how many deaths constituted genocide would present itself 
again in the 1990s during the infamous 1994 State Department spokesperson Shelly’s 
response to the Rwandan genocide when pressured by Reuters correspondent Alan 
Elsner, 
Elsner: How would you describe the events taking place in Rwanda? 
Shelly: Based on the evidence we have seen from observations on the ground, we 
have every reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda. 
Elsner: What’s the difference between “acts of genocide” and “genocide”? 
Shelly: Well, I think the—as you know, there’s a legal definition of this . . . 
Clearly  not all the killings that have taken place in Rwanda are killings to which 
you might apply that label . . . and based again, on the evidence, we have every 
reason to believe that acts of genocide have occurred. 
Elsner: How many acts of genocide does it take to make genocide? 
Shelly: Alan, that’s just not a question that I’m in a position to answer.45 
Regrettably, in this scenario the vagueness of a quantifiable threshold for genocide was 
instead used as an excuse to equivocate and dodge the moral and legal responsibility to 
acknowledge and intervene in Rwanda. The author’s intention, though, was to of course 
strengthen the resolve to quickly prevent and intervene before genocide reached the 
magnitude and destruction of the Holocaust. For American critics of the genocide ban, 
however, fears and apprehension towards ratification were rooted in domestic concerns. 
Opponents to ratification, most notably the American Bar Association, feared ratifying 
the genocide ban opened the Pandora’s Box of American racial prejudices and 
discrimination. Though the genocide convention’s definition would have never supported 
                                                             
45 State Department briefing, Federal News Service, June 10, 1994. 
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indictment’s of the United States’ treatment of Native Americans and discrimination of 
African-Americans Lemkin’s assurances proved little comfort for southern lawmakers. 
 Concomitantly, while opponents raised concern over the expansiveness of the 
definition on the one hand, they criticized its narrowness on the other. American critics, 
hoping to charge their new enemies in the Communist and Soviet blocs with genocide, 
argued the convention’s weakness lie in its narrow focus through the exclusion of 
political groups. Power explains that the “Soviet delegation and its supporters . . . had 
argued that including political groups in the convention would inhibit states that were 
attempting to suppress internal armed revolt.” Likewise, Communist and Soviet delegates 
argued, political groups the cohesiveness and self-identity necessary to constitute a truly 
recognizable group.46  Taking advantage of American self-conscious concerns of past and 
present possibly chargeable racial discrimination and playing on traditional American 
enmity towards any infringement on US state sovereignty the voices of the genocide 
ban’s rang loudly. With the Korean War igniting anti-Communist vehemence and the 
Cold War proxy conflicts intensifying confusing and ever-entangling national interests, 
US ratification of the genocide ban grew increasingly unadvisable as it not only fell out 
national focus but provided fewer and fewer incentives and benefits to US foreign policy. 
 Following strong opposition to the genocide convention the topic died on the 
political stage. It would not be until eight years after Lemkin’s death the crusade for US 
ratification of the genocide convention would be given new life. Since US opposition to 
the genocide ban nearly seventy nations had decided to ratify the convention. Shocked by 
American complete lack of attention and consideration paid to ratifying the convention 
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William Proxmire, a “wiry senator from Wisconsin,”47 decided to champion the cause. 
Delivering his first speech on the genocide ban on January 11, 1967, Proxmire vowed, 
“The Senate’s failure to act has become a national shame. . . I serve notice today that 
from now on I intend to speak day after day in this body to remind the Senate of our 
failure to act and of the necessity for prompt action.”48 Delivering 3,211 speeches over 
nineteen years, Proxmire never wavered from his promise. 
 Proxmire, like Lemkin before, quickly learned the value and driving force behind 
recognizing and employing national interest and political cost to his advocacy. Frustrated 
by critics’ façade of preserving American sovereignty Proxmire decided to shed light on 
the priority established on national interests over sovereignty. Providing example after 
example of international treaties that sacrificed American sovereignty for national interest 
Proxmire exclaimed, 
Included among the hundred-plus treaties are a Tuna Convention with Costa Rica. 
. . a Halibut Convention with Canada. . . a Road Traffic Convention . . . [and] a 
Shrimp Convention with Cuba. I do not mean to suggest that any of these treaties 
should not have been ratified . . . But every one . . . has as its objective the 
promotion of either profit or pleasure.49 
Proxmire correctly concluded that national interest reigns and he must therefore marry 
national interest with US ratification, but what he could never have anticipated was when 
Washington, D.C. deemed it national interest to keep genocidal regimes in power. 
 Resuscitating efforts for US ratification of the genocide convention would 
progress frustratingly slow until Proxmire’s attempts at employing national interest 
combined with the happenchance opportunity of folding in political cost and convenient 
timing of widespread grassroots attention. 
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Chapter 5 
Six Days in June That Turned the Tide 
 
 Beginning in the 1980s the tide began to turn for Proxmire. Riding the wake of 
the popular TV series Holocaust that aired in 1978, Proxmire began connecting public 
discourse with the increasing American sensitivity to the American failure to stop the 
Nazi destruction of European Jewry. “Mr. President . . . Will we do what we can to 
prevent a future Holocaust? Are we willing, at long last, to join the other 96 nations 
which have ratified the Genocide Convention?”50 American consciousness and sensitivity 
to the Holocaust had been growing for a variety of reasons prior to Proxmire’s realization 
of the guttural reaction to the word “Holocaust” in a world after Auschwitz. 
The creation of the State of Israel in 1948, it was hoped, would prove the 
vanguard of protection against future persecution, discrimination, and pogroms that had 
plagued the Jewish community since its Exodus out of Egypt. Jewish consciousness of 
the Holocaust, however, would be shaken into focus once again as this bastion of a 
Jewish homeland was threatened and another holocaust loomed. In the decades following 
the Holocaust silence defined the Jewish Diaspora of refugees out of Europe. Arriving on 
foreign shores around the world many of the Holocaust survivors suffered in silence in 
the effort to protect their children from the horrors they experienced.  
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Though, as United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF) failed to provide peaceful 
negotiations with Israel’s Arab neighbors and with the United States engulfed in the 
international mire of Vietnam Israel found itself the next possible victim to another Cold 
War satellite guillotine. On May 13, 1967, with Soviet Union forces amassing on the 
Syrian border promising support to the Arab coalition in the case of American 
intervention, Israel found herself, once again, alone as the world would only watch on in 
muffled horror as the Jews twice in a single generation faced annihilation. Jewish concern 
for Israel was only heightened as Radio Cairo declared “the existence of Israel has 
continued too long. We welcome Israel aggression, we welcome the battle that we have 
long awaited. The great hour has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy 
Israel.”51 Immediately, within the consciousness of both American and Israeli Jewry the 
advent of another Holocaust was possible. The nightmares, horrors, and realities of just 
two decades prior in Europe were now, once again, a reality in the Middle East. The 
world had not changed. Whether Aryan or Arab the threat of extinction was the same. 
The ranks of American Zionists, Jewish and Gentile alike, swelled in the aftermath of the 
quick, decisive Israeli victory of the 1967 Six Day War and Holocaust survivors began 
taking a more vocal in American Jewish life as the Holocaust was no longer just the past 
but, also, possibly the future.52 
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Chapter 6 
Reagan Ratifies 
 
 With an increasing American sensitivity and reception to the cries of “Never 
Again!” after the 1967 Six Day War, the Holocaust TV series, and President Carter’s 
establishment of the President’s Commission on the Holocaust (which would eventually 
create the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum), the fortieth anniversary of the 
end of World War 2 would provide the essential last piece to the ratification puzzle. 
 In May of 1985, the “Bitburg Affair” would tip the momentum in Proxmire’s 
favor. Hoping to reinforce US-German relations President Ronald Reagan announced a 
planned trip to pay homage at the West German Bitburg Cemetery. Refusing to visit any 
of the Holocaust memorials Reagan made a crucial judgment error by claiming that the 
Nazi Waffen SS officials that were buried in the Bitburg Cemetery were victims “just as 
surely as the victims in the concentration camps.”53 The blowback from Reagan’s 
unfortunate comparison, Republican strategists predicted, was going to cost him the 
Jewish vote. Clamoring to right his political wrong, Reagan desperately needed to repair 
his image. Panicked, Reagan pushed ratification through Congress. Former Justice 
Department Attorney Harold Koh, who had previously pushed the Reagan administration 
towards ratification, remembers, “Bitburg wasn’t a reason for the shift, it was the only 
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reason.”54 Proxmire agreed, “We couldn’t have done it without Reagan. He cut the 
ground right out from under the right wing.”55 
 The “Bitburg Affair” just how influential political cost for inaction can be. 
Pressure had been on the every administration since Proxmire’s first speech in 1967, but 
it was not until the Reagan administration was confronted with potentially losing a large 
constituency of voters was US ratification championed by Washington, D.C. Proxmire 
employed several legitimate ties into national interest, but it was not until those efforts 
were coupled with political cost were they effective. The story of US ratification proves 
that without national interest and political cost for inaction, an administration’s position 
on international human rights treaties is unlikely to change. 
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Chapter 7 
Geopolitics Creates Unlikely Bedfellows 
 
Cambodia  
The year of 1975 brought with it a unique cornucopia of foreign policy 
conundrums and unlikely geopolitical bedfellows. At the same time the US was pulling 
out of its war against the “domino effect” of Communism in Vietnam tides were 
changing in Cambodia. With US troops withdrawing from Vietnam, US interest in 
Cambodia waned and became that much harder to justify.  Eventually, the American 
backed, anti-Communist Lon Nol regime fell and in April 1975, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge 
marched into Phnom Penh. 
  As would become the norm, United States senior officials were aware of the 
coming slaughter but erred on the side of optimism, or apathy. A memo distributed to 
Congress from the National Security Council read, “The Communists are waging a total 
war against Cambodia’s civilian population with a degree of systematic terror perhaps 
unparalleled since the Nazi period—a clear precursor of the blood bath . . . they intend to 
impose on the Cambodian people.”56 Initially, the Ford Administration criticized the 
Khmer Rouge pointing to the atrocities as proof of the veracity of its earlier predictions. 
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Geopolitics, waning national interest, an absence of political cost, and no mechanisms for 
accountability would soon change US foreign policy towards the Khmer Rouge. 
 In December of 1977, with the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, all momentum 
and cries for intervention and condemnation would fall on deaf ears in Washington. 
Backed by the Soviet Union, Vietnam sent in 60,000 troops to quell the border skirmishes 
with the Khmer Rouge and liberate the persecuted Khmer people from Pol Pot’s regime. 
With that move, however, Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, in the eyes of the US at least, changed 
from a genocidal regime massacring its own people to a genocidal regime that provided a 
check against a Soviet backed Vietnamese military presence in Southeast Asia. Pol Pot, 
fully aware of US national interest in the region, played to US concerns, “A [Cambodia] 
that is a satellite of Vietnam is a threat and a danger for Southeast Asia and the world . . . 
for Vietnam is already a satellite of the Soviet Union and is carrying out Soviet strategy 
in Southeast Asia.”57 Pol Pot found an audience. With “Southeast Asia Fatigue” after 
Vietnam presenting no political cost for inaction, and US national interest being defined 
by Cold War geopolitics, the US continued to vote to keep Khmer Rouge officials’ UN 
seats placing Western interests over the suffering of the Khmer people. 
 
Iraq 
 Beginning in March of 1987, the Iraqi genocide of Kurds posed the first real test 
of US foreign policy towards genocide after ratification of the genocide convention. 
Under the guise of a war with Iran, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein began targeting the 4 
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million Kurds in Iraq. This proved difficult, however, as armed rebel groups used the 
mountainous terrain to their advantage providing significant strategic advantages to the 
Kurds and posing serious problems to Hussein’s forces. Therefore, using Iraqi special 
forces, Hussein began his Anfal campaign in February of 1988 to gas, cleanse, and 
eradicate all Kurdish life in Iraq. Men, women, and children were targeted, gassed, or 
bussed into remote areas to be executed by machine gun fire. Hussein’s forces were 
deadly in their tactics. An estimated 100,000 Iraqi Kurds were massacred during 
Hussein’s systematic targeting of Kurdish villages.58 Unfortunately for Iraqi Kurds, 
however, the most recent nation to ratify the genocide convention was silent in its protest. 
Geopolitics and national interest, once again, had made the United States and unlikely 
bedfellow to a genocidal state. 
 Instead of publicly condemning the genocide of the Iraqi Kurds and imposing 
sanctions on agricultural credits to Iraq that would have effectively crippled its economy, 
the Reagan administration preferred to look the other way explaining away the violence 
as simply quelling internal opposition. Instead of instantly condemning Iraqi use of 
poisonous gas against its own people the US chose to deny proof of its happening and 
remained loyal to the genocidal state it had supported in a war against Iran. When 
political cost for inaction is absent when the balance of national interest is swayed by 
geopolitics, history has shown, humanitarian concerns and law pays the price. 
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Bosnia 
 The first test in Iraq of US foreign policy towards genocide after ratifying the 
genocide convention proved politics as usual. Hopes were high, however, that with the 
end of the Cold War the US could play a more positive and effective role in international 
humanitarian law and the prevention of genocide. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
echoed this hope that an expedient world response would prove “an early and crucial test 
of how it will address the critical concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the post-
Cold War world.”59 Bosnia proved these high hopes naïve, empty optimism. 
 The genocide of Bosnian Muslims by the Serbian Yugoslav National Army and 
local Bosnian Serb forces showcased, as the world sat back and watched, that genocide 
was no just a Arab, African, or Asian problem. It was not a third-world problem that 
undeveloped nations seemingly dealt with any time there was a transfer of power that left 
minority groups vulnerable. The genocide in Bosnia embarrassed Enlightened Western 
pride that genocide could still take place in a 20th century European world with seemingly 
strong international bodies with established international humanitarian laws. The Bosnian 
genocide forced the Western world to pay attention, but apparently, not to act. 
 Bosnian Muslim minorities were faced with a life-threatening predicament; 
remain a Yugoslav republic and face persecution under Milosevic, or secede and be 
forced to fully rely on the protection of the international community. Bosnia declared 
independence and non-Serbs suffered in the wake of toothless rhetoric of the international 
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community. Apart from toothless threats, sanctions, peacekeeping missions, and 
humanitarian aid, international intervention would come too little too late. 
 As it would later do in Sudan with the African Union, “the United States would 
happily [step] aside”60 to allow Europeans to fix a European problem. Intervening in the 
Gulf War provided continued open access to oil. Intervening in Bosnia provided no such 
national interest. Keeping politics local is always near and dear to every politician’s 
heart. Bill Clinton during his presidential campaign in 1992 reflected this political 
hierarchy, “I want us to be focused on the problems of people at home. . . I think we’ll 
have more people killed in American today than there are killed in Yugoslavia.”61 
Tragically, Clinton’s estimate would prove deadly wrong and his administration’s policy 
of non-confrontation would allow more than 200,000 Bosnians to be massacred. Bluntly 
stated, “It was not until July 1995 that Clinton would act. By then, another genocide 
would have killed 800,000 people in Rwanda.”62 The US had failed its second chance at 
proving an effective and influential humanitarian actor on the international stage after its 
pledge to prevent genocide. Unfortunately for the 200,000 Bosnians that perished, they 
just did not present enough of a national interest and the American humanitarian will did 
not present a political cost for inaction. Tragically, as Power portends, this would play 
out again on President Clinton’s watch. 
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Rwanda 
 The fastest genocide in history, the Rwandan genocide claimed 800,000 lives in 
just 100 days. Sparked by the April 6, 1994 airplane crash that claimed the life of 
Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana, the Hutu slaughter of Tutsi Rwandans remains 
what former President Clinton still considers one of the biggest mistakes of his 
administration, inspiring subsequent President George W. Bush’s comment in reference 
to Sudan, “Not on my watch.”63 The Rwandan genocide represents not only a failed US 
effort at attempting to prevent and intervene in but a case where the US did not even try. 
It did not just strike out while at base, it did not even show up to play, watch, or referee. 
The Rwandan genocide, of any other genocide, proves the need for a quick, “off the 
shelf” contingency plan in cases of genocide that do not wait for international politicians 
to determine whether or not it constitutes a genocide or whether or not it is in the nation’s 
national interest to intervene. 
 There were a multitude of options available to the Clinton administration short of 
putting American boots on the ground. Similar to the Cambodian genocide US officials 
did not pressure to remove Rwandan UN delegates from their seats. Also, as Power 
points out, the US could have jammed the Hutu radio station that continued to broadcast 
Tutsi “kill lists.”64 This simple and non-confrontational act alone could have frustrated 
Hutu efforts and saved countless lives. Worse than what the US did not do was what it 
did. By demanding the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and refusing UN reinforcements 
US pressure not only irrevocably damaged security conditions on the ground but signaled 
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to the Hutu government forces the weakness of Western and international resolve to 
intervene and prevent further slaughter of Tutsi Rwandans. 
 The Rwandan genocide further demonstrates the need for genocide monitors and 
activists to “keep politics local” when advocating on behalf of prevention and 
intervention. Politicians must be motivated by not only grassroots activism but be shown 
there is a political cost to inaction. The response to the Defense Department’s official 
James Wood by the Pentagon reaffirms the need for political cost in the absence of 
national interest, “Look, if something happens in Rwanda-Burundi, we don’t care. Take it 
off the list. U.S. national interest is not involved and we can’t put all these silly 
humanitarian issues on lists. . . Just make it go away.”65 The lessons in Cambodia, Iraq, 
and Bosnia were not only not applied in Rwanda, but ignored. The price of which cost 
800,000 Tutsi Rwandan lives. Fortunately, many of these same mistakes would not be 
repeated in the US response to Sudan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
65 Woods, James, interview, “The Triumph of Evil,” Frontline, PBS, January 26, 1999, pg. 15; available at 
PBS Online: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html. 
35 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Sudan: Lessons Learned? 
 
 Sudan, Africa’s largest country roughly the size of the United States east of the 
Mississippi river, has been plagued by a intermittent civil war for over four decades 
claiming an estimated 2 million lives in just the past twenty-one years.66 Efforts to end 
the constant violence and seemingly perpetual civil war in Sudan have abound. The first 
formal negotiations were held in March of 1994 under the auspices of the Inter-
Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) consisting of Nigeria, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, former President Jimmy Carter, and the US. Similar peace efforts were made in 
July of 2002 when the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
(SPLA) signed a peace framework agreement in Kenya. May of 2004 saw the 
government of Sudan and the SPLA sign three protocols of power sharing that allegedly 
resolving any outstanding differences or discrepancies between the two parties. The 
following month both parties, once again, met and signed “the Nairobi Declaration on the 
Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan.” However, the most notable peace accord, the Sudan 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, was signed on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi Kenya 
effectively ending the twenty-one year long civil war and setting into place a six-year 
Interim Period before a referendum in southern Sudan. Increasingly apparent, Sudan has 
not been without efforts for peace both internally and from international pressure. Why 
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then, in July of 2004, did the US House and Senate declare genocide to be taking place in 
Darfur with an historic condemnation of genocide from the Bush Administration the 
following September if any of these peace efforts were marginally effective? The case for 
Sudan offers considerable insight into both the positive and negative developments of US 
foreign policy towards genocide since the dawn of the 21st century. 
 Historically, nomadic Arab and sedentary African people groups in the Sudan 
have competed for resources in the Sudan but that competition intensified in the 1970s as 
a string of consecutive droughts plagued the region. Both grazing lands and crops 
suffered as a result. The conflict in the Sudan would not reach a fever pitch, however, 
until in 1983 when large scale oil exploration by foreign companies discovered the 
resource that would exacerbate a civil war and eventually claim another 2 million lives: 
oil. As is the case in most regional conflicts, while religious and ethnic diversity can 
create friction and animosity between people groups, it is a competition over resources 
that drives conflict. Religion, politics, and ethnicity rarely sustain conflicts for long 
periods of time unless otherwise manipulated, exploited, or intensified by a competition 
for resources. Sudan is and was unexceptional in the regard. 
 Beginning in the 1980s, government troops and militias of Baggara would invade 
from the northwest intent on expelling indigenous populations from initial oil exploration 
areas in Blocks 1, 2, and 4.67 This pattern of divide-and-conquer followed closely on the 
heels of newly discovered oil claims throughout the 1990s as a bloody north-south civil 
war raged, once again, concentrated in oil rich areas. The oil-centric nature of the conflict 
in Sudan is still evident today, decades later, as negotiations, power sharing agreements, 
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and conflict all center on the relationship between the oil rich areas in South Sudan and 
the pipeline infrastructure and seaport in the North. The fragile symbiotic relationship 
between Sudan and South Sudan dangerously teeters on both government’s reliance on 
oil revenue, a balance that is easily undone once one is no longer as mutually dependent. 
Peace, at the moment, rests solely on the Sudan’s ability to refine, transport, and sell the 
oil South Sudan produces. The frequent disruption of the oil flow from one side or the 
other as a bargaining chip is a double-edged sword that will only stay sheathed for so 
long. The status quo keeps both governments and military arms at the negotiating table 
but current South Sudan talks with Kenya and Uganda about a possible alternate pipeline 
for South Sudan oil demonstrates how fragile the status quo truly is. 
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Chapter 9 
America’s Response 
 
 Ostensibly, the US response to the Sudan has grown leaps and bounds from the 
examples set by previous administration. Though a year late, the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the Senate did unanimously pass resolutions 467 and 133, 
respectively, that declared the crisis in Darfur to be demonstrably genocide citing Article 
2 of the genocide convention. Also, for the first time in history a US president declared 
genocide to be taking place while it was happening. On September 9, 2004, then 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, declared genocide to have and be taking place in Darfur. 
While the Bush Administration’s historic declaration fell short of demanding immediate 
military intervention it did demand a full UN investigation. The results of the UN 
investigation disappointingly concluded that “the crucial element of genocidal intent 
appears to be missing,”68 effectively forestalling much of the momentum created by the 
Bush Administration’s condemnation but a level of international attention was 
commanded made only possible by such a declaration. The report cited the evidence of 
its finding rest in fact that both Arab and African villages alike were seemingly wantonly 
attacked with no regard to tribe or ethnic identification. While the report’s cited evidence 
is misleading (there are plenty of examples in other reports conducted by various NGOs 
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and NASA satellite imagery that indicates Arab villages were intentionally skipped) the 
finding is consistent with villages located in oil concessions. Unfortunately, apart from 
the US’ role in helping broker the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
the humanitarian aid appropriated for the humanitarian crisis in Sudan little action was 
taken by the Bush Administration after its historic declaration or the Obama 
Administration since. 
 Various reasons may account for this. Since the US condemnation of genocide in 
Sudan it has been engaged in a two-theatre war in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US simply 
did and does not have the political capital to send American troops into yet another Arab-
Muslim nation with large oil reserves. Not only would the American constituencies not 
have an appetite for military intervention but the political clout the US in the international 
community pre-911 does not exist to justify the legitimacy and veracity of its 
humanitarian intentions. 
 Concomitantly, there are positive lessons to be learned from the American 
response to Sudan. Taking advantage of the 10-year anniversary of Rwanda, the 
humanitarian organizations conducted an effective and extensive grassroots campaign to 
mobilize American youth. As Lemkin did so many years  ago, the NGOs “kept politics 
local” and created a perceived political cost for inaction in Darfur. Unfortunately, that 
political cost did not effectively implemented once the momentum of Bush’s genocide 
declaration stalled. 
 National interest, however, is an facet of the US response that stands to be 
strengthened. Historically, genocides have been seen by US politicians as little more than 
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tragedies. The Bush Administration made no mention of US interests being threatened by 
the genocide in Darfur and the case for such threats has not been effectively made by 
activists. One voice, however, has been heard by has received far too few an echo. 
Michael Abramowitz, Director of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
correctly explains, 
Genocide’s negative consequences for the United States are increasingly plain. 
Mass violence destabilizes countries and entire regions, threatening to spread 
trafficking in drugs, arms, and persons, as well as infectious disease pandemics 
and youth radicalization.69 
Proof of Abramowitz’s claims is evident in the fact Osama bin Laden, under the cover of 
civil war, found support and refuge in the Sudan, all the while, using the expansive 
terrain for Al Qaeda training grounds in the mid to late1990s. 
 Conflict breeds conflict. Allowing genocide to go unchecked anywhere in the 
world threatens every peace-loving, democratic nation. Genocidal states in recent years 
have harbored internationally recognized terrorists, funded terror and rebel groups in 
other regions of the world, and rarely does the violence in one genocidal state not spill 
over, in one way or another, into neighboring countries. Sudan exhibited that many of the 
lessons of the past have been remembered but unfortunately the tools at the United States 
disposal are not the same. It no longer possesses the political capital it did during the 
1990s to effectively intervene to prevent genocide. Significant consideration needs to be 
make to either strengthening the language in the genocide convention to create a 
threshold for genocide to avoid useless debates that ultimately amount to semantics, 
establishing an independent international organization with the authority to officially 
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declare and condemn genocide, and an off-the-shelf contingency plan to apply 
immediately until a more comprehensive response is possible. 
 The United States needs to play a more active role in international humanitarian 
law. It could stand to gain significant political clout and capital by effectively negotiating 
humanitarian crises with many of the other major powers like China, Russia, and India 
that are routinely entangled in energy deals with genocidal states. However, until the 
United States is in a position or has the appetite to do so, the focus needs to shift to better 
utilizing international governing bodies to regulate not only the condemned states but the 
other nations that persist in dealing in arms and energy with those genocidal regimes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
1. Annan, Kofi, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary General,” January 25, 2005. 
2. Abramowitz, Michael, “How Genocide Became a National Security Threat,” 
Foreign Policy, June 14, 2013: 1-3.  
3. Bartlett, Robert M. They Stand Invincible: Men Who Are Reshaping Our World. 
New York City: Thomas Y. Corwell, 1959. 
4. Bechky, Perry S. “Lemkin’s Situation: Toward a Rhetorical Understanding of 
Genocide.” Brooklyn Law Review 77, no.2 (2012): 551-624. 
5. Becker, Elizabeth, “Cambodia Offers to Open Borders to Westerners,” 
Washington Post, October 14, 2001, p.A1. 
6. Blum, Rony, et al. "'Ethnic Cleansing' Bleaches the Atrocities of Genocide." 
European Journal of Public Health 18.2 (2007): 204. Web. February 21, 2011. 
7. “Cambodia Fact Sheets,” National Security Council, Sven Kramer to Bill 
Kendall, March 17, 1975, box 5, Vietnam (1) file, Gerald Ford Library, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan. 
8. Cioschi, John. "From Rejection to Ratification: The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the United States." Columbia Undergraduate Law 
Review 3, no. 1 (March 2008): 1-19. 
9. “Clinton-Gore on the Road Again,” Inside Politics, CNN, August 5, 1992. 
10. Congressional Record, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, 113, pt.3:3680. 
11. Congressional Record, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 131, pt. 46:S4386. 
12. Congressional Record, 99th Cong., 1st sess., 1985, 131, pt. 103:S10203. 
13. Dagne, Ted, “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S. 
Policy,” Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, April 12, 
2006: 1-15. 
14. Crowe, David M. “War Crimes and Genocide in History, and the Evolution of 
Responsive International Law.” Nationalities Papers 37, no.6 (November 2006): 
757-806.  
15. Des Forges, Alison, “Ideology of Genocide,” Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 23, 
no.2, Rwanda. (1995). 44-47. 
16. Deuteronomy 2:34 (New Revised Standard Version) 
17. Drabble, Margaret. "A Beastly Century." American Scholar 70, no. 1 (2001). 
43 
 
18. Fowler, Jerry, “A New Chapter of Irony: The Legal Implications of the Darfur 
Genocide Determination,” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 1, no.1 (July 2006). 
29-40. 
19. Gilbert, Martin, ed. The Churchill War Papers: The Ever-Widening War. Vol. 3. 
New York City: W.W. Norton, 2000. 
20. Glanville, Luke, “Is ‘genocide’ still a powerful word?” Journal of Genocide 
Research 11, no.4 (2009). 467-486. 
21. Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. 
London: Michael Joseph, 1994. 
22. Hoffman, David, “Honoring Wiesel, Reagan Confronts the Holocaust; Bergen-
Belsen Put on Trip Itinerary,” Washington Post, April, 20, 1985, pg.A1. 
23. Igiri, Cheryl O.; Lyman, Princeton N., “Giving Meaning to ‘Never Again:’ 
Seeking an Effective Response to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond,” Council on 
Foreign Relations no.5 (2004). 1-36. 
24. Jacobs, Stevens, “The Papers of Raphael Lemkin: A First Look,” Journal of 
Genocide Research 1, no.1, (1999).  
25. Knightley, Phillip. The First Casualty. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, 
1975. 
26. Kristof, Nicholas D., “Taking Bush at His Word,” The New York Times, October 
30, 2004.  
27. Leitenberg, Milton. "Death in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century." Cornell 
University: Peace Studies Program (2006): 1-86. 
28. Lemarchand, Rene, “Unsimplifying Darfur,” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 1, 
No.1 (July 2006). 1-12. 
29. Lemkin, Raphael. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis 
of Government, Proposals for Redress. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944. 
30. Lemkin, Raphael. "Genocide as a Crime Under International Law (1947)." 
American Journal of International Law 41, no. 1: 145-51. 
31. Lemkin, Raphael. The Evolution of the Genocide Convention. Lemkin Papers: 
New York Public Library 
32. Lemkin, Raphael. The Importance of the Convention. Lemkin Papers. New York 
City: New York Public Library. 
33. Lemkin, Raphael. Totally Unofficial: The Autobiography of Raphael Lemkin. 
34. Lippman, Matthew, “Darfur: the politics of genocide denial syndrome,” Journal 
of Genocide Research, 9, no.2, (June 2007). 193-213. 
35. Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Abridged and edited 
with an Introduction and Notes, by Kenneth P. Winkler. Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1996.  
44 
 
36. Marincola, John M., and Aubrey De Selincourt. Herodotus: The Histories. New 
York City: Penguin Classics, 1996. 
37. Morse, David. "War of the Future: Oil Drives the Genocide in Darfur." Common 
Dreams. http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0819-26.htm. 
38. Neier, Aryeh. War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for 
Justice. New York: Times Books, 1998. 
39. Nicolle, David. Crusader Warfare. I, Byzantium, Europe, and the Struggle for the 
Holy Land, 1050-1300. London: Continuum, 2007.  
40. “Pledge to Plead Daily for Ratification of Genocide Treaty,” Congressional 
Record, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1967, 113, pt. 1:266. 
41. Power, Samantha. A Problem From Hell: American and the Age of Genocide. 
New York: First Harper Perennial, 2007. 
42. Prunier, Gerard. Darfur: the Ambiguous Genocide. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2005. 
43. Reeves, Eric, “Current Proposals for Responding to Genocide in Darfur,” Institute 
for the Study of Genocide, September 23, 2004. Pg.1-10. 
44. Reeves, Eric, “Darfur: Shame and Responsibility,” Dissent, (Fall 2006): 5-10. 
45. Rosenthal, A.M., “A Man Called Lemkin,” New York Times, October 18, 1988, p. 
A31. 
46. Santosuosso, Antonio. Barbarians, Marauders, and Infidels. Boulder: Westview 
Press, 2004. 
47. Shattuck, John, “US Can Help End Darfur Genocide,” Boston Globe, July 15, 
2004. 
48. Straus, Scott, “Rwanda and Darfur: A Comparative Analysis.” Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 1, 1 (July 2006): 41-56. 
49. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Genocide Convention: Hearings 
Before the Senate Committee on the International Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment on the Crime of Genocide, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950. 
50. Simons, Marlise. "International Court Adds Genocide to Charges Against Sudan 
Leader." The New York Times, July 12, 2010, p. A4. 
51. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, June 10, 1994. 
52. Stern, David H. Complete Jewish Bible. Clarksville, MD: Jewish New Testament 
Publications, Inc., 2006.  
53. "Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights." Human Rights Watch (2003): 1-581. 
54. Teluskin, Rabbi Joseph. Biblical Literacy: The Most Important People, Events, 
and Ideas of the Hebrew Bible. New York: Harper Collins, 1997. 
55. Tobin, Jonathan S. "Did They Remember the Holocaust?: An attempt to debunk 
the "myth" of postwar silence contradicts both memory and sense." Politics & 
Ideas (April 2009): 55-58.  
45 
 
56. UN General Assembly, Prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, 9 
December 1948, A/RES/260. 
57. Urofsky, Melvin I. We Are One!: American Jewry and Israel. Garden City, NY: 
Anchor Press/Double Day, 1978. 
58. U.S. Department of State press release, Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s 
press conference and statement, “New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution in the 
Former Yugoslavia,” February 10, 1993, U.S. Department of State Bureau of 
Public Affairs, Washington D.C. 
59. Weiss-Wendt, Anton. "Hostage of Politics: Raphael Lemkin on "Soviet 
Genocide"." Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 4 (December 2005): 551-59.  
60. Woods, James, interview, “The Triumph of Evil,” Frontline, PBS, January 26, 
1999, pg. 15; available at PBS Online: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/woods.html. 
